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a judicial one; and it is before a court which exercises a peculiar
jurisdiction. The proceeding is, as it is technically termed, in rem,
and the general rule, as to the effect and conclusiveness of a judgment, sentence or decree thereupon pronounced, is familiar: Starkie on Evidence *241-8.
A valuable and instructive discussion of the plea of res judicata
as estoppel, and of the replication thereto, is found in Robinson's
Practice, vol. 7, ch. 1, tit. 1, where the leading cases are compared,
criticised and distinguished.
ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE.
Wasbington. D. 0,
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Circuit Court of the United State. District of California.
HO AH KOW v. MATTHEW NUNAN.
An ordinance of San Francisco, that every male person imprisoned in the
county jail, under the judgment of any court having jurisdiction in criminal cases
in the city and couutyr, should immediately upon his arrival at the jail, have the
hair of his head "1cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from the scalp
thereof," and made it the duty of the sheriff to have this provision enforced, is
invalid, being in excess of the authority of the municipal body, whether the measure be considered as an additional punishment to that imposed by the court upon
conviction under a state law, or as a sanitary regulation, and constituted no justification to the sheriff acting under it.
The ordinance being directed against the Chinese only, imposing upon them a
degrading and cruel punishment, is also subject to the further objection, that it is
forbidden by that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
declares that no state "shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." This inhibition upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agencies employed in the administration of its government; to its
executive, legislative and judicial departments ; and to the subordinate legislative
bodies of its counties and cities.
The equality of protection thus assured to every one whilst within the United
States, implies not only that the courts of the country shall be open to him on the
same terms as to all others for the security of his person or property, the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts, but that no charges
or burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by others, and that
in the administration of criminal justice, he shall suffer for his offences no greater
or different punishment.

THIS was an action brought to recover damages for alleged maltreatment by the defendant, sheriff of San Francisco. The maltreatment consisted in having cut off the queue of the plaintiff, a
queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being
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regarded by them as degrading and as entailing future suffering.
Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor, in violating a state
statute "concerning lodging-houses and sleeping-apartments within
the limits of incorporated cities," and sentenced to pay a fine of
ten dollars, or in default of such payment to be imprisoned five
days in the county jail. Failing to pay the fine, he was imprisoned. The defendant, as sheriff of the city and county, had
charge of the jail, and during the imprisonment of the plaintiff
cut off his queue.
Defendant pleaded a justification of his conduct under an ordinance of San Francisco, which declared that every male person
imprisoned in the county jail, under the judgment of any court
having jurisdiction in criminal cases in the city and county, shall
immediately upon his arrival at the jail, have the hair of his head
"cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from the scalp
thereof," and made it the duty of the sheriff to have this provision enforced. Under this ordinance the defendant cut off the
queue of the plaintiff. To this plea plaintiff demurred.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The validity of the ordinance is denied by the plaintiff on two grounds: 1st. That it exceeds the authority of the
Board of Supervisors, the body in which the legislative power of
the city and county is vested; and, 2d. That it is special legislation imposing a degrading and cruel punishment upon a class of
persons who are entitled, alike with all other persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States, to the equal protection of the
laws. We are of opinion that both these positions are well taken.
The Board of Supervisors is limited in its authority by the act
consolidating the government of the city and county. It can do
nothing unless warrant be found for it there, or in a subsequent
statute of the state. As with all other municipal bodies, its charter-here the Consolidation Act-is the source and measure of its
powers. In looking at this charter, we see that the powers of the
board, and the subjects upon which they are to operate, are all
specified. The board has no general powers, and its special power
to determine the fines, forfeitures and penalties which may be
incurred, is limited to two classes of cases : 1st. Breaches of regulations established by itself; and 2d. Violations of provisions of
the consolidation act, where no penalty is provided by law. It
can impose no penalty in any other case; and when a penalty
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other than that of fine or forfeiture is imposed, it must, by the
terms of the act, be in the form of imprisonment. It can take no
other form. "No penalty to be imposed," is the language used,
"shall exceed the amount of one thousand dollars,, or six months
imprisonment, or both." The mode in' which a penalty can be
inflicted, and the extent of it, are thus limited in defining the
power of the board. In their place nothing else can be substituted.
No one, for example, would pretend that the board could, for any
breach of a municipal regulation or any violation of the consolidation act, declare that a man should be deprived of his right to vote,
or to testify, or to sit on ajury, or that he should be punished with
stripes, or be ducked in a pond, or be paraded through the streets,
or be seated in a pillory, or have his ears cropped, or his head
shaved.
The cutting off the hair of every male person within an inch
of his scalp, on his arrival at the jail, was not intended and cannot
be maintained as s,measure of discipline, or as a sanitary regulation. The act by itself has no tendency to promote discipline,
and can only be a measure of health in exceptional cases. Had
the ordinance contemplated a mere sanitary regulation,.it would
have been limited to such cases and made applicable to females as
well as to males, and to persons awaiting trial as well as to persons
under conviction. The close cutting of the hair which is practised
upon inmates of the state penitentiary, like dressing them in
striped clothing, is partly to distinguish them from others, and
thus prevent their escape, and facilitate their recapture. They
are measures of precaution, as well as parts of a general system
)ftreatment prescribed by the directors of the penitentiary under
the authority of the state, for parties convicted of and imprisoned
for felonies. Nothing of the kind is prescribed or would be tolerated with respect to persons confined in a county jail for simple
misdemeanors, most of which are not of a very grave character.
For the discipline or detention of the plaintiff in this case, who had
the option of paying a fine of ten dollars, or of being imprisoned
for five days, no such clipping of the hair was required. It was
done to add to the severity of his punishment.
But even if the proceeding could be regarded as a measure of
discipline, or as a sanitary regulation, the conclusion would not
help the defendant; for the board of supervisors had no authority
to prescribe the discipline to which persons convicted under the
laws of the state should be subjected, or to determine what special
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sanitary regulations should be enforced with respect to their persons. That is a matter which the legislature had not seen fit to
intrust to the wisdom and judgment of that body. It is to the
board of health of the city and county that a general supervision
of all matters appertaining to the sanitary condition of the county
jail is confided; and only in exceptional cases would the preservation of the health of the institution require the cutting of the hair
of any of its inmates within an inch of his scalp: Act of April
4th 1870; Session Laws of 1869-70, p. .717. The claim, however, put forth that the measure was prescribed as one of health, is
notoriously a mere pretense. A treatment to which disgrace is
attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against
the escape of the prisoner, but merely to aggravate the severity
of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence
of the sentence, it is punishment in addition to that imposed by
the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence, it is wanton
cruelty.
In the present case, the plaintiff was not convicted of any
breach of a municipal regulation, nor of violating any provision
of the consolidation act. The punishment which the supervisors
undertook to add to the fine imposed by the court was without
semblance of authority. The legislature had not conferred upon
them the right to change or add to the punishments which it
deemed sufficient for offences; nor had it bestowed upon them the
right to impose in any case a punishment of the character inflicted
in this case. They could no more direct that the queue of the
plaintiff should be cut off than that the punishments mentioned
should be inflicted. Nor could they order the hair of any one,
Mongolian or other person, to be clipped within an inch of his
scalp. That measure was beyond their power.
The second objection to the ordinance in question is equally
conclusive. It is special legislation, on the part of the supervisors,
against a class of persons, who, under the constitution and laws of
the United States, are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
The ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco. This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and
was so understood by every one. The ordinance is known in the
community as the "queue ordinance," being so designated from
its purpose to reach the queues of the Chinese, and it is not
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enforced against any other persons. The reason advanced for its
adoption, and now urged for its continuance, is, that only the
dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his
fine. That is to say, in order to enforce the payment of a fine
imposed upon him, it is necessary that torture should be superadded to imprisonment. Then, it is said, the Chinaman will not
accept the alternative, which the law allows, of working out his
fine by his imprisonment, and the state or county will be saved the
expense of keeping him during th imprisonment. Probably the
bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, or the rack, would
accomplish the same end; and no doubt the Chinaman would prefer either of these modes of torture to that which entails upon him
disgrace among his countrymen, and carries with it the constant
dread of misfortune and suffering after death. It is not creditable
to the humanity and civilization of our people, much less to their
Christianity, that an ordinance of this character was possible.
The.class character of this legislation is none the less manifest,
because of the general terms in which it is expressed. The statements of supervisors, in debate on the passage of the ordinance,
cannot, it is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the
meaning of the terms used; but they can be resorted to for the
purpose of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed, and the mischiefs sought to be remedied. Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognisance. When we take our seats on the bench, we are not struck
with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms, only
operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally
understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or
class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body
adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it
accordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the
general terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a
fact in its history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically
become obsolete. If this were not so, the most important provisions of the constitution, intended for the security of personal
rights, would, by the general terms of an enactment, often be
evaded and practically annulled: Brown v. Piper, 1 Otto 42;
Ohio Loan and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 485. The complaint in this case shows that the ordinance acts with special
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severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them suffering
altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other
prisoners, if enforced against them. Upon the Chinese prisoners
its enforcement operates as "a cruel and unusual punishment."
Many illustrations might be given. where ordinances, general in
their terms, would operate only upon a special class, or upon a
class, with exceptional severity, and thus incur the odium and be
subject to the legal objection of intended hostile legislation against
them. We have, for instance, in our community a large number
of Jews. They are a highly intellectual race, and are generally
obedient to the laws of the country. But, as is well known, they
have peculiar opinions with respect to the use of certain articles of
food, which they cannot be forced to disregard without extreme
pain and suffering. They look, for example, upon the eating of
pork with loathing. It is an offence against their religion, and is
associated in their minds with uncleanness and impurity. Now,
if they should, in some quarter of the city, overcrowd their dwellings, and thus become amenable, like the Chinese, to the act concerning lodging-houses and sleeping-apartments, an ordinance of
the supervisors, requiring that all prisoners confined in the county
jail should be fed on pork, would be seen by every one to be
levelled at them; and, notwithstanding its general terms, would
be regarded as a special law in its purpose and operation.
During various periods of English history, legislation, general
in its character, has often been enacted with the avowed purpose
of imposing special burdens and restrictions upon Catholics; but
that legislation has since been regarded as not less odious and
obnoxious to animadversion than if the persons at whom it was
aimed had been particularly designated.
But, in our country, hostile and discriminating legislation by a
state against persons of any class, sect,-creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution. That amendment, in its first section, declares who are citizens of the United States, and then
enacts that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge their privileges and immunities. It further declares that
no state shall deprive any person (dropping the distinctive term
citizen) of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor
deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. This inhibition upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agenVOL. XXVIL-86
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cies employed in the administration of its government; to its
executive, legislative and judicial departments; and to the subordinate legislative bodies of counties and cities. And the equality
of protection thus assured to every one, whilst within the United
States, from whatever country he may have come, or of whatever
race or color he may be, implies not only that the courts of the
country shall be open to him on the same terms as to all others,
for the security of his person or property, the prevention or redress
of wrongs and the enforcement of contracts, but that no charges or
burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by
others, and that, in the administration of criminal justice, he shall
suffer for his offences no greater or different punishment.
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Congress has
legislated for the purpose of carrying out its provisions in accordance with these views. The Revised Statutes re-enacting provisions of law passed in 1870, declare that "all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to-like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and
to no other." (See. 1977.) They also declare, that "every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected.
any citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress." (Sec. 1979.)
It is certainly something in which a citizen of the United States
may feel a generous pride that the government of his country
extends protection to all persons within its jurisdiction; and that
every blow aimed at any of them, however humble, come from what
quarter it may, is "caught upon the broad shield of our blessed
constitution and our equal laws." (Judge BLACK'S argument in
the Fos8at case, 2 Wall. 703.)

We are aware of the general feeling-amounting to positive
hostility-prevailing in California against the Chinese, which
would prevent their further immigration hither, and expel from the
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state those already here. Their dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in language, manners and religion would seem, from
past experience, to prevent the possibility of their assimilation with
our people. And thoughtful persons, looking at the millions which
crowd the opposite shores of the Pacific, and the possibility at no
distant day of their pouring over in vast hordes among us, giving
rise to fierce antagonisms of race, hope that some way may be
devised to prevent their further immigration. We feel the force
and importance of these considerations; but the remedy for the
apprehended evil is to be sought from the general government,
where, except in certain special cases, all power over the subject
lies. To that government belongs exclusively the treaty-making
power, and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and, with the exceptions presently mentioned, the power to prescribe the conditions
of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these
particulars, with those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is
gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can never be
admitted. The state may exclude from its limits paupers and
convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased, and others
likely to become a burden upon its resources. It may, perhaps,
also exclude persons whose presence would be dangerous to its
established institutions. But there its power ends. Whatever is
done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the general
government. That government alone can determine what aliens
shall be permitted to land within the United States, and upon what
conditions they shall be permitted to remain; whether they shall
be restricted in business transactions to such as appertain to foreign
commerce, as is practically the case with our people in China, or
whether they shall be allowed to engage in all pursuits equally
with citizens. For restrictions necessary or desirable in these
matters, the appeal must be made to the general government; and
it is not believed that the appeal will ultimately be disregarded.
Be that as it may, nothing can be accomplished in that direction
by hostile and spiteful legislation on the part of the state, or of its
municipal bodies, like the ordinance in question-legislation which
is unworthy of a brave and manly people. Against such legislation it will always be the duty of the judiciary to declare and
enforce the paramount law of the nation.
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The plaintiff must have judgment on the demurrer to the de.
fendant's plea of justification; and it is -so ordered.
SAWYER,

Circuit Judge, concurred.

The learned judge, who delivered
the foregoing opinion, had two questions to deal with of no little difficulty
and delicacy. The first relates to the
power of the legislature to accomplish
by indirect means that which it could
not avow in its action and accomplish
directly. The second is, what does the
constitution forbid as unequal and class
legislation ?
It is matter of every-day observation
that legislatures are accustomed to
treat constitutional limitations as imposing no moral obligation whatever
upon their members. If, therefore,
their desires lead them to evade or
break over the limitations, and they
can do so without encountering direct
and positive prohibitions, they do not
hesitate to do so, and they violate the
spirit of the law without scruple, while
they keep within a strict construction
of its words. Sometimes this may be
done with impunity, because it is done
under a pretence of something lawful,
which no one is at liberty to disprove
or dispute ; as Congress prohibited the
circulation of state bank-notes, while
pretending merely to provide for the
collection of a revenue from them :
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.
But where the purpose is apparent in
the legislation itself, construed in the
light of'such facts as the court may
notice judicially, so that extrinsic evidence is not necessary to unfold it,
there is no reason why the judiciary
should hesitate to stamp as unconstitutional the indirect and circuitous evasion of the fundamental law, any more
than it should a violation that is direct
and avowed.
Some of the cases in which legislasures have attempted to avoid the prohi-

bition of special legislation, by passing
laws general in form, but applicable to
single cases only, are instructive. It
is known that many of the states have
gone a great ways in requiring general
legislation wherever it could he made
applicable, and in forbidding special
acts in many cases. These provisions
are often found to run counter to the
desires of legislators, and they are then
evaded, if evasion is found to be practicable. Thus, a legislature forbidden
to grant divorces, may undertake to
empower a court to do so in a particular and exceptional case : Teft v. Tot,
3 Mich. 67 ; Simonds v. Simonds, 103
Mass. 572. Or, having no power to
impose a pecuniary obligation upon a
municipality, may attempt to do so
indirectly, by giving validity and force
to the unauthorized action of individuals : Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.
37; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 I1. 218.
See Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev. 68 ;
People v. Supervisor, 4-c., 16 Mich. 254.
Or, being prohibited from passing incorporation acts, may attempt to so
remodel and extend the corporate powers of an existing corporation as in
effect to create a new corporation :
San Francisco v. Spring Valley Waterworks, 48 Cal. 493.
Many such illustrations might be
given, but the principle which underlies them all is the same. The case
of Devine v. Commissioners of Cook Co.,
84 Ill. 590, is particularly instructive.
It was there held, that designating
counties as a class, according to a minimum population, which makes it absolutely certain hut one county in the
state can avail itself of the benefits of a
law applicable to such class, is nothing
but a device to evade the constitutional

HO AH KOW v. NUNAN.
provision forbidding special legislation,
and is void for that reason. Compare
Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio (N. S.) 85,
and Kiigore v. Magee, 85 Penn. St.
401, which seem to be contra, but are
distinguishable.
If, therefore, the legislation condemned in the principal case was calculated
and designed to be offensive to, and
inflict pain upon, people of one nationality only, and would have been void if
in terms restricted in its application to
that people, the general terms in which
it is couched ought not to save it from
condemnation.
The existence of a particular evil,
however, is sometimes the occasion for
passing a general law; and the fact
that but a single case is likely to come
under it, cannot affect the power of the
legislature to pass it, where the law in
good faith is made general in its scope.
There exists, for example, in the state
of New York a communistic society,
which is understood to hold and put in
practice doctrines on the subject of sexual intercourse between its unmarried
members, which are of vicious example
and abhorrent to the moral sense of the
people of the state ; and it would be a
singular and certainly a futile objection
to a general law for the punishment
of their practices, that because the
practices did not exist outside of their
society, therefore the law was partial
and oppressive. The validity of a
penal law can never be tested by the
number who disregard it; on the contrary, the fact that nearly everybody
abstains from the forbidden conduct is
generally very good evidence that it
ought to be forbidden.
But there is and can be no authority
in the state to punish as criminal such
practices or fashions as are indifferent
in themselves, and the observance of
which does not prejudice the community or interfere with the proper liberty
of any of its members. No better
ilustration of one's rightful liberty in

this regard can be given than the fashion of wearing the hair. If the wearing of a queue can be made unlawful,
so may be the wearing of curls by a
lady, or of a mustache by a beau, and
the state may, at its discretion, fix a
standard of hair-dressing to which all
shall conform. The conclusive answer
to any such legislation is, that it meddles with that which is no concern
of the state, and therefore invades private right. The state might, with even
more color of reason, regulate the
tables of its citizens, than their methods of wearing their hair ; for the first
might do something towards establishing temperance in eating, while the
other would be simply absurd and
ridiculous.
But if the state cannot regulate the
fashions of the hair of those outside the
prisons, what right can it have to regulate them for persons in confinement
under its laws ? In other words, what
is there in the fact, that one is undergoing confinement for a breach of the
penal laws that can enlarge the authority of the state in this regard ?
The common impression that a prisoner under sentence is pretty much at
the arbitrary disposal of his keeper, is
not only exceedingly erroneous, but it
is one that leads to many abuses. Tue
principle that limits his power, we suppose to be clear enough : he may do
whatever is necessary to give complete
effect to the sentence of the law, but he
cannot go a step further, because the
prisoner is confided to him for that
purpose, and for no other. He may,
therefore, subject him to the restraint
of irons, if necessary to his detention ;
he may compel him to submit to sanitary regulations essential to health ; he
may force him to work, if such is the
sentence; he may require him to wear
the prison uniform, not only. because
of its convenience, but because of its
utility in preventing escapes ; and he
may compel the observance of other
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regulations, which have the general
purpose of the sentence in view, and
are not purely arbitrary. But if female
prisoners were subjected to regulations
shocking to the modesty of a virtuous
woman, or male prisoners to those of
an inleeent nature, there should be no
difficulty in holding that their rights
were violated. Convicts have all the
rights of other citizens, except as these
are limited by the sentence of the law
and proceedings for its proper execution.
If the cutting off of the queue could
be defended as a sanitary regulation, or
as being needful and proper to prevent
escapes, or as removing something that
interfered with the performance of the
convict's labor, when labor is a part
of his punishment, there would be a
show of reason for saying that the regulation came within the implied powers
of the prison authorities. But nothing
of this sort can be pretended. The
wearing of the hair in this way is no
more unhealthy than female fashions
of the hair in general, and the convict
can be kept as well and can work as
well with it on as with it off. The regulation for the cutting off of the queue
is, therefore, a regulation not important to the preservation of discipline in
the prison, or to the due enforcement
of the sentence to imprisonment, and is
therefore illegitimate and illegal.
The avowed reason for establishing
this regulation was that the dread of its
enforcement would compel obedience to

the law by persons who feared neither
the fines nor the imprisonment which
the law imposed. Nothing more plainly
than this avowal could show that the
learned judge was right in holding that
the regulation imposed a punishment.
It could not have done so more distinctly had it provided that every day
the convict remained in prison, he
might be subjected to the discipline of
the whip. No doubt this might have
deterred some persons from the commission of crime, but it would not for
that reason become legal. Punishments are limited by the sentence ot
the law, and whatever is imposed beyond that is illegal, irrespective of its
tendency. Moreover, the law itself is
limited in respect to the punishments
for which it may provide. The constitution prohibits those of a cruel and
unusual nature, but the requirement
of equal protection of the laws to all
persons is also prohibitory. When the
law imposes a punishment which only
a certain class of persons, because
of peculiar but innocent habits, sentiments or beliefs, can feel, and imposes
it for the avowed purpose of affecting
this class as others are not affected, it
seems plain that not only is the equal
protection of the laws denied to the
class, but that they are directly and
purposely subjected to pains and penalties which others, of different habits,
sentiments or beliefs, are never expected to feel.
T. M. C.

SuPreme Court of Indiana.
.BOWEN

ET AL.

V. SULLIVAN.

The finder of lost property has a title to it superior to that of any other person
except the loser or real owner. The place of finding makes no difference in this
rule.
An employee in a paper factory, whilst engaged in assorting a bale of old papers
purchased by the proprietor for manufacture, found certain lost, genuine bank
hills enclosed in a clean, unmarked and undirected envelone, which formed part
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of such bale ; and, to ascertain whether they were genuine, delivered them to the
-sprictor, on his promising to return them; but he retained the same, notwithstanding the demand of the finder, who brought suit for the value thereof. Held,
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

FROM the Carroll Circuit Court.
Ellen Quinn, a minor, found two fifty-dollar bank-bills on the
premises of the appellants, and handed the same to them, requesting to be informed if they were genuine. Appellants retained
the bills, declining to return them to the finder, on demand. The
appellee, Catherine Sullivan, the guardian of said minor, instituted
this suit to recover the value of said bills. Issues were formed and
tried by a,jury; verdict for the plaintiff; motion for a new trial
overruled, and judgment on the verdict.
J. Applegate, for appellants.
C. B. Pollard,for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-The pleadings, on which the cause was tried, were
good on demurrer, but some of them might have been subject to a
motion to make more certain: Hart v. Crawford, 41 Ind. 197;
Doman v. Bedunnah, 57 Id. 219; Wilson v. Kelly, 58 Id. 586.
As bearing on this part of the case, we cite Tancil v. Seaton,
28 Grat. (Va.) 601, where it is decided, that "the finder of a
bank-note, as against a bailee without reward, to whom he delivers
it to be kept for such finder, has such a possessory interest in the
note as entitles him to recover the same of the bailee, on his
refusal to redeliver it to the finder on request, and in the absence
of any claim of the rightful owner made known by him to such
bailee."
On the trial, the court, of its own motion, gave to the jury the
following instructions, which were all that were given in the
cause:
"The third and fourth paragraphs allege, in substance, that the
plaintiff's ward found two bank-notes, of the denomination and
value of fifty dollars each, on the defendants' premises (in their
paper-mill) ; that her said ward handed said notes to one of the
defendants, to ascertain if they were genuine, and upon a promise
that he would return them to her; that the defendants kept said
notes and converted them to their own use; therefore she prays
judgment, &c.
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"The second and third paragraphs of the answer aver, in suistance, that the defendants are co-partners, engaged in the maDufacture of paper, in Carroll county; that, for the purpose of their
business, it is their custom to purchase rags of different colors ad
qualities; that the said bank-notes were purchased with other rags,
in Kansas, by the defendants, and are their property; that the
plaintiff's ward took said bank-notes from their premises, withouz
right, but afterward returned them to the defendants.
"The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. In order to entitle
her to recover, she must prove the material allegations of her complaint by a preponderance of the testimony; that is, by a fair
weight of the testimony. The finder of lost property is the owner
of it as against every person except the loser, or real owner. If
you believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff's ward found the
said bank notes in the defendants' paper-mill, and if you believe
said bank-notes were lost property, you should find for the plaintiff.
The primary question is, were the notes lost property ? If they
were, it can make no difference whether they were found upon the
highway, in the defendants' paper-mill, or in their dwelling-house;
the difference between the highway, the place of business or the
dwelling-house (so far as this case is concerned), is a difference
only as to the degree of privacy; the place of business is more
private than the highway, and the dwelling-house is more private
than the place of business.
"But, if ihe bank-notes were lost property. and the plaintiff's
ward found them, it does not matter where she found them; they
belong to her as against every person but the loser, or real owner.
But, if you believe from the evidence, that, as alleged in the third
and fourth paragraphs of the answer, the defendants had purchased
said bank-notes as rags, then they were not lost property, and you
should find for the defendants.
"As I have already said to you, the plaintiff must make out her
case by a preponderance of the testimony. You cannot indulge
in any presumption in her favor, but you have a right to draw
natural inferences from all the facts proven; and, if you believe
from the evidence, that the said bank-notes were found by the
plaintiff's ward among the rags or paper belonging to the defendants, in their mill, and that said bank-notes got there by accident,
and were not placed there purposely by the person of whom the
rags and papers were purchased by the defendants, and the defend-
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ants did not know they were among the rags when they made the
purchase, then I instruct you that said bank-notes were lost property, and you should find for the plaintiff."
The evidence in the cause consisted of oral testimony.
Ellen Quinn's testimony was as follows:
"I am acquainted with the defendants. In May 1876, they
were engaged in the manufacture of paper, about half a mile from
Delphi. I am a half-sister of Ann Sullivan, who was working for
the defendants in the spring of 1876. 1- went to the paper-mill
of the defendants in the spring of 1876. I was not in their employ. My sister had been, for a week or two. I found some
money in the paper-mill of defendants, in May 1876, on Wednesday. Up to that time I had never been in the employ of the
defendants. I found the money in the mill, on the floor, in a clean
envelope, not in a package. In about five minutes afterward I
showed it to Charley McClane. He took it to Huchtenhouser to
see if it was good, and Huchtenhouser took it to the defendant
Abner T. Bowen. There were two fifty-dollar bills in the envelope. I found the envelope three or four feet from where the girls
were assorting papers. There was no name or other mark upon
the envelope. I threw the envelope back on the floor. The next
morning I asked the defendant Abner T. Bowen for the money,
and told him he promised to give it back. He did not give me the
money, but offered to give me ten dollars, if I would be satisfied,
which I refused to take. I asked him if he had bought this money
or lost it. He said he had not. This money has never been
returned to me. Charlie McClane was the first person I told
about having found it. The defendant, Abner T. Bowen, got this
money for the purpose of seeing whether it was good or not. He
said it was genuine. I am sixteen years old."
And upon cross-examination this witness further testified
"I found this money in the room of the paper-mill where they
assorted old papers for the purpose of manufacturing the same into
new paper. The room was about 15 by 30 feet. There were five
persons engaged there at the time in assorting. The old papers are
received in bales which are placed upon the floor, cut open, and the
contents taken out and put in screens. The persons then engaged
there in assorting the papers were Sarah and Mary Alberts, Annie
McClane, Mattie Kist and Alma Sullivan. I asked Abner T.
Bowen if the money was good. He said it was. I asked him for
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it. He asked me, if I thought the money belonged to me. I told
him I thought it did until the proper person came. I then asked
him, if he bad bought the money or lost it. He said no. I meant
by that, if he claimed it as his property. He said he did not. I
told him I would like to have it. He offered me ten dollars, and
asked me if I would take that and be satisfied. I said I would
not. The room where this money was found is the assorting room
of the paper-mill, up stairs. The envelope, in which it was, was
nice, clean and new, and had no writing or mark upon it. There
were papers scattered all over the floor when I found it. I don't
think there was a space on the floor more than four inches square,
not covered with old papers. I found this money about 3 o'clock
in the afternoon, and when I picked it up was nearer to Annie
McClane than any person else, and about three or four feet from
her. There were three screens in this room and two persons working at each."
Abner T. Bowen, one of the defendants, and a witness for the
defendants, testified as follows:
"Charlie and Huchtenhouser came to me together, Charlie said
she wants the money back, even if it is not good.' Don't know
that I said anything to him about returning it. The next morning I saw Ellen Quinn in the machine-room. She said, 'what
about the money?' I said, 'it is good money; who do you think
this money belongs to?' She said she supposed it belonged to
me, but thought she needed it more than I did. I asked her what
she would do about it. She said, just as I said. I then offered
her ten dollars. She shrank back and refused to take it. Said I
ought to give her at least half of it; if she had lost one hundred
dollars and any one had found it and brought it to her, she would
have divided equally with them. She repeated several times that
she needed it worse than I did. I said that had nothing to do
with it. She said she ought to have thrown it in the papers, and
it would have been ground up, and I never would have received
any benefit of it. I said nothing about not having bought it.
That is about what I said, and would think about it. She said she
found it in an envelope marked ' Kansas City.' She was working
for us that week and the week before, receiving wages for her
labor. I never gave her any authority to take those bills from the
place where they were found."
On cross-examination he further testified:
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"1If that money was found in a bale of papers, we had bought it
and paid for it. Huchtenhouser kept the accounts with the girls
in the assorting room ; so I can not certainly say whether Ellen
was in our employ the day the money was found. I did not know
that money was there. We did not get it by accident. I think
it was purchased with old paper. I think Ellen was working for
us the day the money was found. I think I have a memorandum
of the day the money was found, but can't now tell the day nor
month. It was entered on our cash book the day it was found.
At the time I got the money I did not intend to give it back."
* The testimony of the foregoing witnesses represents the conflict
in the testimony in the case on the part of the plaintiff and defendants. There was no evidence that the envelope containing the money
had been accidentally or carelessly laid down or dropped in the
paper-mill by a visitor at the mill, so that the cases of MvcAtoy v.
Medina, 11 Allen 548, and Lawrence v. The State, 1 Humph.
227, are not applicable in the case at bar.
There was no evidence that the envelope was purchased by special contract, including it and its contents, so that the case of
Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W. 623, is not applicable.
Ever since the case of Armory v. Delamire, 1 Strange 505,
in which a chimney-sweeper's boy, having found a jewel, left it
with a goldsmith to ascertain what it was, was held entitled to
recover it, the law has been steady and uniform that the finder of
lost property has a right to retain it against all persons except the
true owner. Tancil v. Seaton, 28 Gratt. 601; Lawrence v. Buck,
62 Mie. 275. And ordinarily the place of finding is immaterial.
Tatum v. Sharless, 6 Phila. 18, and cases cited.
The jury in the case now before this court might have found
from the evidence that an envelope was picked up from the floor
of the defendants' paper-mill by Ellen Quinn; was opened by her
and found to contain two $50 bills; that the bills were taken by
her and the envelope returned to the floor; that the envelope was
purchased by the defendants at the rate of two and a half cents
per pound, as waste-paper, raw material, to be used in the manufacture of paper; that neither the seller of the envelope nor the
buyer of it knew that it contained the bills in question, and only
sold and bought and paid for the envelope ; that the rightful owner
3f the money is still unknown. Had the notes or bills in question

692

BOWEN v.S.ULLIVAN.

been lying upon the floor, unenclosed when found, the case would
have fallen within most, if not all, the approved authorities.
The distinguishing feature of the case is, that the bills were
found contained in an article of property which had been purchased by and belonged to the defendants. Did that fact carry
with it the property in the bills in question ?
The case more nearly in point than any other which has fallen
under our observation is JDurfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588. Duitp.E,
0. J., said: "The facts in this case are briefly these: InApril 1874
the plaintiff bought an old safe and soon afterwards instructed his
agent to sell it again. The agent offered to sell it to the defendant for $10, but the defendant refused to buy it. The agent then
left it with the defendant, who was a blacksmith, at his shop for
sale for $10, authorizing him to keep his books in it until it was
sold or reclaimed. The safe was old-fashioned, of sheet-iron, about
three feet square, having a few pigeon-holes and a place for books,
and back of the place for books a large crack in the lining. The
defendant shortly after the safe was left, upon examining it, found
wecreted between the sheet-iron exterior and the wooden lining a
toll of bills amounting to $165, of the denomination of the national
bank-bills which have been current for the last ten or twelve years.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew the money was there
before it was found. The owner of the money is still unknown.
The defendant informed the plaintiff's agent that he had found it,
and offered it to him for the plaintiff; but the agent declined it,
stating that it did not belong to either himself or the plaintiff, and
advised the defendant to deposit it where it would be drawing interest until the rightful owner appeared. The plaintiff was then
out of the city. Upon his return, being informed of the finding,
he immediately called on the defendant and asked for the money,
but the defendant refused to give it to him. He then, after taking
advice, demanded the return of the safe and its contents, precisely
as they existed when placed in the defendant's hands. The defendant promptly gave up the safe, but retained the money. The plaintiff brings this action to recover it or its equivalent."
The court held, that, as the purchase was of the safe, not the
safe and its contents, the money was not embraced in the purchase.
"The plaintiff" (say the court) "claims that he is entitled to
have the money by the right of prior possession. But the plaintiff
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never had any possession of the money, except, unwittingly, by
having possession of the safe which contained it. Such possession,
if possession it can be called, does not of itself confer a right. The
case at bar is in this view like Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 15 Juiist
1079. In that case, the plaintiff, while in the defendant's shop on
business, picked from the floor a parcel containing bank-notes. He
gave them to the defendant for the owner if he could be found.
The owner could not be found, and it was held that the plaintiff as
finder was entitled to them, as against the defendants as owner of
the shop in which they were found. 'The notes,' said the court,
'never were in the custody of the defendant nor within the protection of his house, before they were found, as they would have been
if they had been intentionally deposited there.' The same in effect
may be said of the notes in the case at bar; for though they were
originally deposited in the safe by design, they were not so deposited
in the safe, after it became the plaintiff's safe, so as to be in the
protection of the safe as his safe, or so as to affect him with any
responsibility for them. The case at bar is also in this respect
like Tatum v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18. There it was held, that a
conductor who had found money which had been lost in a railroad
car was entitled to it against the railroad company."
It is also claimed in this case, that the finding of the money was
a wrongful act, and that, therefore, the defendants (appellants)
have a right to hold the money. We do not concur in this view.
The defendants insist that Ellen Quinn, the finder, was in their
employ as a rag-assorter, and that, therefore, what she found wbile
so in their employ belonged to them.
The evidence would have sustained such a finding and in support of the verdict, perhaps we should have been in favor of it. If
she was so in the defendant's employ, the finding of the money
was not wrongful. In the elaborate case of Brandon v. Planters'
and Aterchants' Bank of Huntsville, 1 Stewart 320, it was hell
that lost property found by a slave belonged to his master, but we
have found no case to which this doctrine has been applied as between employer and employee. See Taturm v. Sharpless, and Durfee v. Jones, supra.
See, on this general subject, note to Bailey v. Tie State, 52 Ind.
462: The N. Y. & Harlem RailroadCo. v. Haws, 56 N. Y. 175.
It is claimed that the appellants, in purchasing the envelope
containing the bills by weight, purchased the bank-bills in ques-
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tion. -Their existence was unknown when the envelope was purchased, and their weight was so infinitesimally small, compared
with their value, that we do not concur in this proposition. It is
unreasonable.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
That the finder of a lost chattel has
a special property in the article found
which will entitle him to possession
thereof as against all the world but the
real owner, is and has been the general
rule of law ever since the decision by

third person took the case in question
out of the general rule. Some of these
excepting circumstances were alleged to
exist in the principal case, and the
plaintiff's right was claimed to have
been controlled by the circumstances,
Lord Chief Justice PRATT in Armory that the notes were found on the floor
Y. Delamire, I Strange 504, where the of the defendant's mill, that the notes
chimney-sweeper's boy who found the had probably been purchased amongst
jewel was held entitled to it as against some rags by the defendants, which it
was claimed gave a right of possession,
all but the real owner, and was allowed
though the purchase was an unwitting
to recover from one who subsequently
withheld it from him. This rule has one; and, though this claim seems to
have been very doubtfully supported by
not been departed from, and has been
the evidence, by the circumstance that
enforced in some' quite recent cases.
at the time of finding the finder was in
See Lawrence v. Buck, 62 Me. 275
(1874) ; Tancil v. Seaton, 28 Gratt. 601 the defendants' employment. The case
then suggests sundry considerations with
(1877); Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588
regard to the law governing the rights
(1877).
Trover may be maintained by
of a finder as against all but the true
the finder, possession being a sufficient
owner of the article found, and we protitle in the absence of a superior one,
pose to consider,
upon which to maintain that action
1st. When property is considered as
Sutton v. Buch, 2 Taunt. 302 (1810)
Clark v. Maloney, 3 Harrington 68 lost and found.
2d. How the special property acquired
(1839); Brown v. Ware, 25 Me. 411
by the finder is affected by the character
(1841) ; and, the defendant in trover
of the thing found.
cannot set up as a defence a title in a
3d. Whether the rights of the finder
third person without deriving to himself title from that third person : Pink- are affected by the place in which the
lost article is found.
ham v. Gear, 3 N. H. 484 (1826);
4th. How far the rights of the finder
Duncan v. Spear, 11 Wend. 53 (1833);
are affected by a relationship subsisting
Harker et al. v. Dement, 9 Gill 7
between him and a third person as that
(1850).
of master and servant ; and
It is, however, rarely that a contest
5th. We will consider the claim which
has arisen, nor at the present day can
a finder has against the true owner for
we easily imagine that a contest could
compensation for finding and recovering
arise, over the rule itself, but in many
an article, or for expense incurred in
cases it has been alleged either that what
taking care of it; though this subject is
is called a finding was not such in law, or
that the circumstances arising from va- rather suggested by than involved in the
rious sources connected with the nature principal case.
First, then- When is property consid.
of the thing found, the place of finding
ered as lost andfound? On this head it
or the relations borne by the finder to a
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may be remarked that a thing must be
really lost to the owner before it can be
found ; and property which the owner
merely and intentionally lays down or
knowingly deposits in a place and then
forgets for a time where he has put it,
is by no means to be considered in a
legal view as lost. As said by BREESE,
J., in Lawrence v. The State, I Humph.
228 (1839), "The loss of goods in
legal and common intendment, depends
upon something more than the knowledge or ignprance, the memory or want
of memory of the owner as to their
locality at any given moment. If I
place my watch or pocket-book under
my pillow in a bed-chamber, I may
leave them behind me ; but if that is all,
I can not be said with propriety to have
lost them. To lose is not to place anything carefully and voluntarily in the
place you intend and then forget it; it is
casually and involuntarily to part from
the possession; and the thing is then
usually found in a place or under circumstances to prove to the finder that
the owner's will was not employed in
placing it there." In that case a customer in a barber's shop had placed his
pocket-book upon a table therein, and
his attention being attracted by a fight
in the street, he had gone out of the
shop forgetting the pocket-book, which
the barber afterwards picked up and
appropriated ; it was held by the court
that the pocket-book had not been lost,
and therefore that the act of the barber
in appropriating it was not finding but
felonious taking. Somewhat similar in
principle to this case was McAvoy v.
Medina, 11 Allen 548 (1866), where
the plaintiff picked up a pocket-book in
a barber's shop and handed it to the
barber to keep for the true owner. The
true owner did not appear and the plaintiff sued the barber for the book. In
the opinion of the court, DEWEY, J.,
said, "1This property is not under the
circumstances to be treated as lost property in that sense in which the finder

has a valid claim to hold the same ontil
called for by the true owner. The property was voluntarily placed upon a
table in the defendant's shop, by a customer of his, who accidentally left the
same there and has never called for it.
The plaintiff also came there as a customer and first saw the same and took it
up from the table. The plaintiff did
not by this acquire the right to take the
property from the shop, but it was rather
the duty of the defendant owner to use
reasonable care for the safe-keeping of
the same until the owner should call for
it." His honor then distinguished the
case from Bridges v. Hawksworth, infra,
and remarked on itq resemblance to
Lawrence v. The State. In Kincaid v.
Eaton, 98 Mass. 139 (1867), the same
doctrine was held, although in that case
the owner of the property had himself
considered it so far lost that he had advertised a reward for its recovery. The
property in question, again a- pocketbook, was picked up from a desk in a
banking-house, where the owner had
left it accidentally, on going out of the
bank, by a boy who shortly after came
into the bank on an errand. Led by the
advertisement the boy took the pocketbook to the owner, who while giving
him a gratuity, refused to pay the reward offered; an action being brought
therefor, the court gave judgment for
the defendant, on the ground that the
reward was offered for the recovery of
lost property and that as the pocket-book
was not, legally speaking, lost, the
reward was not earned. See also, to
the same effect, as to what constitutes
losing, State v. M3cCann, 19 Mo. 249
(1843) ; Peoplev. McCarren, 17 Wend.
460 (1837).
As to the finding it may be remarked,
in addition to what has incidentally
been suggested by what has gone before,
that the finding must be in good faith,
as said by STROUD, J., in Tatum v.
Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18, "The right of
the finder depends on his honesty and
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the entire fairness of his conduct. The
circumstances attending the finding
must manifest good faith on his part.
There must be no reason to suspect that
the owner may be known to him or
might have been ascertained by proper
diligence." Therefore, if one find
goods whose owner he knows or can
readily ascertain from marks upon the
goods, or from the circumstances under
which he finds them and appropriates
them to himself, he will not be regarded
as a finder but as guilty of larceny :
Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W. 623
(1841) ; Wynne's Case, I Leach C. C.
460 (1784); Cartwright v. Green, 8
Ves. 405 (1803) ; State v. Weston, 9
Conn. 527 (1833).
And this is the
case even if his intentions on first finding
the goods were honest, if h afterwards
determine to appropriate them to himself: Wynne's Case. Besides this, the
possession acquired by finding must be
one known to the finder himself as
such; no mere physical possession, as
for instance that of bills hidden away
in the cracks of a chest, or in a secret
drawer without knowledge on the part
of the owner of the receptacle, of their
existence, or as in the principal case,
notes in a bundle of rags, will constitute
Agenuine possession acquired by finding
-it must be by an intelligent, known
act. An excellent illustration of what
is not a good possession is afforded by
the case of Durfee v. .Tones, 11 R. I.
588, and also by Merry v. Green,
zupra, though the aet through which
possession was claimed to have accrued
was not finding but purchase. The
plaintiff had purchased a secretary, at
the sale of a gentleman's effects, for
the sum of 11. 6d. In repairing the
article there were discovered some
secret drawers, and in them some notes
and guineas, which the plaintiff appropriated. He was arrested on a charge
of larceny, but was discharged, and
then brought an action for assault and
false imprisonment, and obtained a ver-

diet. PAXRKE, B., in giving the opinion
of the Exchequer in granting a new
trial, said, " It was contended that there
was a delivery of the secretary and the
money in it to the plaintiff as his cwn
property, which gave him a lawful possession and that his subsequent misapplication did not constitute a felony.
But it seems to us that though there
was a delivery of the secretary, and a
lawful property in it thereby vested in
the plaintiff, there was no delivery so as
to give a lawful possession of the purse
and money. The vendorhad no intetion to deliver it nor the vendee to receive
it; both were ignorant of its existence, and
when the plaintiff discovered * * * the

purse and money it was a simple case
of finding," and, of course, in that point
of view, the bonafides of the plaintiffs
action became of importance. We may
conclude then, that if a person should
find an article and thereby acquire a
special property therein, and after it
had passed out of his possession another
should discover therein money or other
valuables, of which the finder had
known nothing, the special property
in the receptacle would give to the finder
no title to the after-discovered contents.
2. The second matter to be considered
is : How the specialproperty acquired by
the finder is affected by the character of
the thing found. The general rule as to
a chattel, properly so called, has been
already stated ; as to choses in action it
would seem to be the rule that the finder
obtains no right either to the thing represented or the instrument of evidence
found. As a familiar example of this
may be instanced, the finding of a bill
of exchange or promissory note, where
the finder acquires no such property as
will enable him either to defend in
trover or to maintain an action against
the maker oracceptor: Byles on Bills
360. This rule, however, is by no
means of universal application, and at
the present day the law would seem to
recognise the fact that there are choses
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in action which generally pass and are
:rCated as chattels, and as to them to
allow a special property to be acquired
by finding as in the case of chattels.
This conclusion was not, however, arrived at at once, In JRLaugldin v.
WI'aite, 9 Cowen 670 (1827) which was
a case involving the right of the finder
of a lottery ticket to recover the money
called for by it, SAVAGE, C. J., compared the lottery ticket to a bank-note,
and held that there could be no recovery.
Vend. 404), in affirmOn appeal (5
ing the judgment of the Court below,
WALWORTH, Ch., said: " This principle [i. c. the rule as to chattels] is not
applicable to the present case. A negotiahle instrument, a banker's check,
is a mere chose in action or evidence of
the right of the real owner; the lottery
ticket vendor's certificate can have no
greater validity. All property in choses
in action must depend on a contract
It is not
either express or implied.
property but an evidence of property.
* * * If property is abandoned it is in
a state of nature, and the first possessor
is entitled to it ; but if a right in action
or contract for the delivery of property
is voluntarily relinquished by the person entitled to the same, the right is
It may be noted that the Court
gone."
of Appeals by no means unanimously
agreed in the opinion of the chancellor,
for ALLEN, Senator, delivered a strong
dissenting opinion, and the vote on
affirmance was fifteen for and ten
against. We much question whether
the case would be considered authority
at present, and the reasoning of the
chancellor has been criticized in a later
case, which seems to be a much better exponent of the law as to such
In
choses in action as bank-bills.
Tancilv. Seaton, 28 Gratt. 601 (1877),
a bank-note had been found by the plaintiff who intrusted it to the defendant,
from whom it was stolen, and an action
was brought to recover its value.
Amongst other defences it was set
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up that property in a bank-note could
not be acquired by finding. BUaR, J.,
after holding that money would follow
the rule of Armory v. Delamire, said :
"Bank-notes are not money in a strict
sense,* * * but for most purposes, as the
transaction of business and by common
consent, they are considered and treated
as money. 'They are not esteemed '
says

Lord

MANSFIELD,

'as

goods,

securities or documents of debt ; but are
looked on as money, as cash in the ordinary course and transaction of business by the general consent of mankind,
which gives them the credit and currency of money to all intents and purliller v. Race, Burr.
poses.' * * *
452. Such being their character we
can see no good reason why the finder
of a bank-note of a solvent institution
does not acquire by the finding the
same title as the finder of a personal
chattel, and why ke is not entitled to the
same remedies against third parties."
We may note that McLaughlin v. Waite,
would seem to be of doubtful authority,
except possibly as to the chose in action, (viz : a lottery ticket), directly involved, even in New York, for in Mfatthews v. Hansell, I E. D. Smith 393;
(1852), the contest was over some banknotes which had been found by the
plaintiff, and the New York Common
Pleas did not apparently consider the
character of the property in question
any obstacle to a recovery. To sum
up, we think, that on this head the law
may be stated: That while in general
the finding of a chose in action confers
no title upon the finder, yet choses in
action which by the common consent
and the current action of men are
treated as chattels will be considered
as supporting a special property in their
finder.
3. As to whether the rights of the
finder are affected by the place in which
lost chattels are found. It must here
be premised that the place of finding
is not here considered where it enters
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Into the question of the bona fides of
the finder, as in Lvrence v. State,
Wynne's Case, and cases of that
class, but only as to whether it
affects the title acquired by a bona fide
finding. On -this head the rule would
seem to be that the place of finding
makes no difference in the title of the
finder, and that the owner of the premises upon which a chattel is found, acquires no title to the chattel as a quasi
accretion. This is the English doctrine,
and, although in Matthews v. Hansell,
J., said that he
supra, WOORUIT,
would hesitate to endorse it, may be regarded as the law in this country also.
It is probably best exemplified in England by the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 15 Jurist 1079 (1851), and in
the United States by the carefully considered case of Tatum v. Sharpless, decided by the District Court of Philadelphia, at a time when that court
was composed of SHARSWOOD, P. J.,
STROUD and HARE, JJ. In the first
case, the plaintiff had picked up a parcel of Bank of England notes on the
floor of the defendant's store, which he
had entered on business, and had given
them to the defendant to keep for the
owner. The notes were duly advertised, but were never claimed by the
owner. After three years the plaintiff
demanded the notes, but the defendant
refused to surrender them. PATTESON,
'
J., said : " The case resolves itself into
the simple point * * * whether the circumstance of the notes being found in
the defendant's shop gives him, the deendant, the right to have them as
against the plaintiff who found them.
* * * It was well asked on the argument if the defendanthas the right when
did it accrue to him ? If at all it must
have been antecedent to the finding by
the plaintiff, for that finding could not
give the defendant any right. If the
notes had been accidentally kicked into
the shop [street I] and then found
by some one passing by; could it be

contended that the defendant was entitled to them, from the mere fact of
their being originally dropped in his
shop ? If the discovery had never been
communicated to the defendant, could
the real owner have had any cause of
action against him because they were
found in his house? Certainly not.
The notes ne7er were in the custody of
the defendant nor within the protection
of his house before they were found, as
they would have been had they been intentionally deposited there."
In Tatum v. Sharpless, the plaintiff,
a conductor of a street-car, found in
his car a pocket-book, which he delivered to the defendant, the receiver of the
railway company, who duly advertised
it. The custom of the company was to
retain lost articles for a year, and then,
if not called for, to return them to the
finder. A year having elapsed and no
claimant appearing, the conductor applied for the pocket-book, which was
refused to him. The court gave judgment for the conductor, saying, after
noticing the English cases, "The important point in these decisions was
that the place in which a lost article is
found does not constitute any exception
to the general rule of law that the finder
is entitled to it as against all persons
except the owner."
4. Upon the question as to how far
the right of the finder is affected by the
fact that he stands in the rehttion of
servant to a third person, the authorities
we have met with, with one exception,
and that exception more apparent than
real, are uniform in substance that the
fact does not deprive the finder of his
right or vest it in the taster. That
this is the only rule consonant with
reason and justice, will be seen by a
very brief consideration of what the relation of master and servant, except in
the case of slavery, is. It is a contract
for services of a certain kind, specified
in the contractor implied from the character of the position, a work assumed
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by the servant; as the engagement of a
domestic servant as such, without more,
would constitute an engagement to perform household duties, perhaps run errands, and do such work as is generally
connected with the position of domestic
servant ; it is not a contract whereby
the servant gives up all his rights, or
merges his identity in, or surrenders his
freedom of action to his master, except
so far as the purposes of the contract or
position require ; of course, whatever
he does as serrant, or within the scope
of the contract, is for his master's benefit, but not what he does without such
scope. Of course, if a master were to
engage a servant expressly to search for
lost articles of third persons for him,
the lost article found by such servant
would become the master's property,
but it can be hardly said that in an ordinary case of hiring in any capacity, or
for any kind of work,the search for lost
articles, or the finding, accidentally, of
lost articles of third persons, for the
benefit of the master, is in the contemplation of the parties to the contract.
The question was raised in Ellery v.
Cunningham, I Met. 112 (1840). where
the mate of a vessel had found floating
two bales of cotton in port, and it was
contended by counsel for the owners of
the vessel (citing Bacon's Abr. tit.
Master and Servant, Reeve's Domestic
Relations 343,and 1 Com. on Contracts),
that the bales having been found by a
servant belonged to his masters, the
vessel owners, and therefore, that there
was no consideration for a promise by
the owners who had received the cotton
from the mate to account for it to him if
they could not find the owners. SHAW,
C. J., did not notice the argument drawn
from the relation of master and servant,
but held that there was sufficient consideration for the promise in the surrender of the cotton, the mate having
acquired a special property therein.
In Matthews v. Hansel!, supra, a servant who had found bank-notes in the

house of her employer, was allowed to
maintain an action for them against a
third person. In this case the employer
assented to the action, so that his rights
were not passed upon. The same point
was raised in Tatum v. Sharpless, and
there rested on the responsibility of the
master for his servant's actions ; hut
STROUD, J., said : "It was suggested
that the relation between the plaintiff
and the company was that of master and
servant, and that probably should the
parcel found be surrendered by the company to the plaintiff, the true owner,
should he appear and prove his property, might compel its delivery or damages for withholding it. If the law
would sustain such a demand, there
would be very firm ground for the defendant to stand upon ; no authority of
the kind was referred to on the argument, and I have not been able to meet
any. "
The only case which we have been
able to find which recognises a right in
the master of the finder, as master, for,
of course, cases involving seignorial
rights stand on an entirely different
ground, is Brandonv. Planters' and Aferchants' Bank, I Stew. (Ala.) 320 (1828);
but in that case the finder was a slave,
and the law recognised no rights of
property in a slave, whose whole time
and all his services, of whatever kind,
belonged to his owner; consequently, as
there was no contractual relation between owner and slave, the case is not
to be considered with reference to that
relation of master and servant which
arises out of a contract either express or
implied.
5. The fifth subject-the claim which a
finder has, against the true owner of a
chattelfound, for compensation for finding or recovering the article, or for ex.
pense incurredin the care of it, is, as we
have already remarked, not directly involved in the decision of the principal
case, but is suggested by it.
At first sight natural justice might
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seem to require that a person who has
found and taken care of, or, perhaps, at
great trouble and expense, has recovered property belonging to another, should
have a lien upon the property, if not for
the voluntary service of capture, at least
for the outlay upon and services to the
property after it has come into his
hands. Such, however, is not the case.
The civil law is thus stated by Domat:
"He who has found a thing that is
lost is obliged to preserve it and take
care of it in order to restore it to its
owner, * * * and whenever he does
restore it, whether it be money or any
other thing, he cannot detain any part
of it, nor demand anything for having
found it :" 2 Cush. Domat, pt. 1, tit.
2 IX. 2. This is recognised as the
common law, also by HUNT, J., in ,S7eldon v. Sherman, 42 N. Y. 484 (1870).
In Etterv. Edwards,4 W'atts 63 (1838),
SERGEANT, J.,
said: "Treating the defendant as the finder of lost property, it
is well settled that he had no lien for
expenses gratuitously incurred in taking care of it." See also Nichol-son v.
Chapman, 2 H. Blackst. 254 (1793)
Binsten v. Buck, 2 W. Blackst. 1117;
Preston v. Neall, 12 Gray 222 (1838).
Whether the finder having no lien,
has even any claim for services or
expenses in finding or recovering the
lost article, would seem not to be clearly
settled. The passage in Domat above
quoted and recognised, would seem to
deny the existence of any such claim,
but in Nicholson v. Chapman, supra,
EYRE, L. C. J., apparently considered
it a matter of doubt, and said : "This
is a case of mere finding and taking
care of the thing found for the owner.
This is a good office and certainly entitles the party to some reasonable recompense from the bounty, if not from
the justice of the owner; and of which,
if he were refused, a court of justice
would go as far as it could go towards
enforcing the payment; * * * perhaps it
is better that these voluntary acts of

benevolence should depend on the moral
duty of gratitude. In Amory v. Fqnn,
10Johns. 102 (1813),the Court (KENT.
C. J., TisoMPsoN, SPENCER, VAN NES8

and YATES, JJ.), was of opinion that
if a person who had captured some runaway geese had been put to any expense in securing them, such expense
ought to be refunded, and SERGEANT, J.,
in Etter v. Edwards, supra, said : ' It
seems it remains yet to be authoritatively decided what are the duties of a
finder of lost property, and whether he
can recover compensation for the labor
and expenditure he may voluntarily
bestow upon it; or whether, in the absence of a promise of reward, the obligation of the owner is an imperfect one,
resting merely on his bounty."
See
also Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns.
28 (1822), where the court seemed to
be of opinion that a merely voluntary
service conferred no right of action, no
matter how great the value of such service, or the loss incurred in its performance.
While, however, the finder has, as
such, no lien, and while, for the mere
finding his right to compensation even
is doubtful, though expense is involved
therein, yet if he necessarily lays out
expense upon the article found, he has
a right to recover compensation therefor. Again, to quote Domat: "The
person to whom one restores the thing
which he had lost, is obliged on his part
to repay the money that has been laid
out in keeping the thing or in delivering
it to him, as if it was some strayed
beast which it was necessary to feed, or
the carriage of the thing from one place
to another, had obliged the person in
whose custody it was, to be at some
charges, or, if any money had been laid
out in advertisements or in having the
thing cried to give notice to the owner."
In Preston v. Neall, supra, METCALF J.
said : "The law which is applicable to
cases of deposit by finding * * * is to be
applied to this case * * * although in
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cases of the deposit above mentioned
the depositaries have no lien on the
property, yet we are of opinion that
they are legally entitled to compensation for the care and expense of keeping and preservation." See also Chase
v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871).
Of courre what has been said as to
the non-existence of a lien in favor of
the finder does not apply in cases where
a lien is given by contract. It is well
settled that a lien may be given by
contract (Baker v. Hoag, 7 Barb. 113
(1849)), and the offer of a reward for
the finding and return of a lost article,
acted upon, is equivalent to a contract,
and will confer a lien upon the finder
to the extent of the reward. In MVentworth v. Day, 3 Mete. 352 (1844), in
which a reward had been offered for
the recovery of a lost watch, SHAW, C.
J., said : "If the loser * * * will
make an express promise of reward
either to a particular person or in general terms to any one * * * and in
consequence of such offer one does return it to him, it is a valid contract.
Until something is done in pursuance
of it, it is a mere offer and may be revoked. But if before it is retracted, one
so far complies with it as to perform the
labor for which the reward is stipulated, it is the ordinary case of labor
done on request and becomes a contract
to pay the stipulated compensation. * **
But the more material question is
whether under the offer "the finder"
had a lien. * * * In many cases the
law implies a lien from the presumed
intention of the parties arising from the
relation in which they stand. Take
the ordinary case of the sale of goods
where the parties are strangers to each
other, * * * the vendor has a lien on
the property for the price, and is not
bound to deliver it till the price is paid,
nor is the purchaser bound to pay
till the goods are delivered. They
are acts to be done mutually and
simultaneously. * * * [In the pres-

ent case] the natural, if not the nocessary implication, is that the acts
of performance were to be mutual and
simultaneous; the one was to give up
the watch on payment of the reward ;
the other to pay the reward on receiving
the watch."
See also Cummings v.
Gann, 52 Penn. St. 484 (1866).
We
may also remark that where a reward is
offered for the recovery of goods, which
are naturally devisable, a recovery of a
portion of the goods *ill entitle the
person returning them to a pro rata
share of the reward offered : Symmers
v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344 (1810). It
must, however, be noted, that in order
to sustain a lien, the reward offered
must be of a definite character, a specified sum, as the law does not favor indefinite liens, and therefore, the offer of
a "reward," a "liberal reward," or a
"suitable reward," will not entitle the
finder to hold the article found until
what is a proper, liberal or suitable reward is settled. The question is well
discussed in WMdsonv. Guylon, 8 Gill 213
(1849), where the plaintiff had offered
a "liberal reward" for the recovery of
his horse, and, having possibly rather
peculiar views of liberality, had refused
to give the defendant three dollars, the
amount claimed by him, whereupon
the defendant refused to surrender the
horse and action was brought. DoRsEs,
C. J., while recognising the law to be
that where a reward was offered a lien
would be given, said: "But in the
case before us, there is no ground for
the implication of such a lien from the
compact of the parties. There was no
fixed or certain reward offered. * * *
The offer was to pay a ' liberal reward.' Who was to be the arbiter of
the liberality of the offered reward ? It
could not be supposed that the owner by
his offer designed to constitute the recoveror of his property, the exclusive
judge of the amount to be paid him as
a reward, and it is equally unreasonable
and unjust to say that the owner should
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be such exclusive judge. In the event
of a difference between them upon the
subject, the amount to be paid must be
ascertained by the judgment of the appropriate judicial tribunal. This would
involve delays incident to litigation,
and it would be a grave perversion of
the intention of the owner to infer from
his offered reward, an agreement on
his part that he was to be kept out of

the possession of his property till all
the delays of litigation were exhausted.
To the bailee * * * such a lien woulc
rarely be valuable, except as a means
of oppression and exaction, and therefore the law will never infer its existence, either from the agreement of the
parties or in furtherance of public convenience or policy."
H. BUDD, JR.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
MARY GREVE FT AL. v. THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE ST. PAUL
AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
Where a railroad company enters upon land and lays its track thereon before
making compensation to the owner, the latter is not entitled to have the damages
estimated by the value of the land, including the road-bed, ties, &c.
Although the railroad was a trespasser, and any accretions to the soil made by
a trespasser becomes the property of the owner of the soil, yet in a proceeding to
assess damages in such a case the proper measure is only whatever will give just
compensation for the laud taken.

APPEAL from District Court, county of Ramsey.

John B. Brsbin, and W. P. Warner, for appellants.
Geo. L. J C. E. Otis, for respondents.
The opinion of the court wasdelivered by
GILFILLAN, 0. .- It appears that, prior to instituting any proceedings to ascertain and pay the compensation to be paid for
taking the land in controversy, the respondent, the railroad company, constructed and was operating its road across such land. It
instituted such proceedings in 1870, and in those proceedings the
question arises, is the owner entitled to have the amount which the
company must pay for the right of way estimated upon the basis of

the value of the land, including the road-bed, ties, rails, &c., laid
on it by the company, or of the value of the land without these
improvements?
The question is new in this court. The cases in this court, referred to by the appellant, have very little bearing upon it. Cray

v. First -DivisionSt. P. & P. .ailroad Company, 13 Minn. 315,
and Hursh v. Same, 17 Id. 439, and Warren v. Same, 21 Id. 424,
hold that until compensation is made to the owner, a railroad com
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pany has no right to take possession of land and construct its road
on it; and the cases of Hursh and Warren hold that, in the case
of this company, the time of filing the report by the commissioners
is the time which is to be taken for the purpose of fixing the compensation.
In Brisbine v. The St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad Co., 23
Minn. 114, Brisbine was a riparian owner on the Mississippi river.
The City of St. Paul for a street, and the railroad company for its
track, had filled in front of his lot, into the river, raising the bed
of the river above the surface of the water, and on this raised land
the company had laid its track. The company contended here that
Brisbine was not entitled to any compensation for this raised land.
The court held that he was.
The proposition that the value which the city or company had
added to the land by raising it, should be excluded in estimating
the compensation, was not made by nor passed upon by this court.
In this case the company having entered upon the land without
making compensation, and, so far as the case shows, without the
consent of the owner, was (technically, at least), a trespasser,
and I have no doubt that where a trespasser affixes anything to
the soil it becomes, in strict law, a part of the soil, and belongs to
the owner of it; and if the value of the land, taken at the time
when taken, is to be the sole measure of compensation for the
taking, this would be conclusive of the appellant's right to have the
value of these ties, rails, &c., included. But while the value of
the land taken is very important, and in many cases the controlling element, it is not, as has been frequently held by this court,
the sole consideration in arriving at the amount of compensation.
Thus, in Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn.
267, it was held that where the land taken was part of a larger
parcel used as a farm, the commissioners were not confined to the
damages done to, or the value of, the land actually taken, but
might inquire into the effect of the taking upon the whole tract;
and also, that the expense to the owner of fencing, rendered
necessary by the construction of the road, is a proper element of
damage.
In Winona &. St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515,
it was held that in a like case special benefits to the part not taken
were to be deducted from the damages caused by the taking of the
part taken. In Colvill v. St. Paul& 07ieago Railroad Co., 19
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Minn. 283, increased exposure to fire of buildings on the land not
taken was held to be a proper element of damages. In Scott P. St.
Paul &' Ch. BailroadCo., 21 Minn. 322, the charter provided that,
on appeal from the award of commissioners, the jury should assess
the "value" of the land taken, and the court construed the word
"value" to embrace not merely the value of the land taken as a
separate parcel, but also such additional value as attached to it by
reason of its connection with adjacent land of the same owner;
and in Warren v. FirstDivision St. Paul& Paqfic Railroad Co.,
21 Minn. 424, it -was held that where the jury assess the damages
as of the date of the award of the commissioners, interest should
be allowed on the amount of the verdict from the date of the
award of the entry of judgment, except where the owner has,
between the award and verdict, had the actual possession and use,
and derived benefit and value therefrom, in which case such value
should be deducted from the interest. All these cases proceed on
the ground that the value of the land taken is not in all cases to be
the measure of compensation, but that when necessary to make the
compensation just, fair and equitable, as the constitution, sect. 13,
art. 1, sect. 4, art. 10 requires, the compensation allowed may be
more or may be less than such value. This reduces the inquiry in
this case to the point, does just compensation require that the
appellant should be allowed the value which the company has added
to the land by laying its track upon it?
That, in an action of ejectment, she might recover the track
with the land, does not dispose of the question, for in such action
the parties would rest on the technical rule as to what constitutes
the realty, and she would recover the whole or- none. The sole
question, in such case would be, what belongs strictly to the realty?
The question of what the company ought in justice to pay for taking
the land for public use, could not enter into nor affect the case.
It was conceded. on the argument that the company took possession of the land some years before proceedings to obtain the right
of way were commenced, and constructed its road over it and has
been operating the road ever since., When the proceedings were
commenced does not appear, but it is not questioned on the argument that in taking possession of, and constructing its road over
the land, it intended to make this a part of its general line, and
ultimately to secure, in the manner prescribed by law, the right to
retain the land for that purpose, and the company was operating

GREVE v. FIRST DIV. OF ST. PAUL, &o., RAILROAD CO. 705

-under a charter which in terms authorized it to enter upon, and construct and operate its road over, the land in advance of making the
compensation required by the constitution; although, notwithstanding this, the company was, under the decisions of this court upon the
constitutionality of this part of the charter, a trespasser in constructing its road over the land without first making just compensation. We think these facts ought to be considered when the
question between the company and the owner is what is just compensation to be made by the former to the latter for the taking.
When we are not bound down by any technical rules of property,
but may enter into the consideration of what, under the circumstances, is just and equitable between the parties, we can see no
reason for allowing the appellant the value of the road-bed, ties
and rails, which the respondent has placed upon the road. The
court below was right in excluding such value, and the order denying a new trial is affirmed.
BERRY, J., concurring.-I agree to the general conclusion
arrived at by the majority of the court in this case, viz. : That the
appellant is not entitled to recover for the road-bed, ties and rails;
but I dissent from the reasoning by which that conclusion is reached.
I think that, with some modification, the reasons given for an
analogous conclusion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Justice v. The Nesquehoning Valley Railroad Co., 6 Norris 28,
are much more sound and satisfactory.
The precise question involved in the
principal case seems to have been raised
but rarely in the courts, and it is only
within the last few years at all. Certain
it is that the explanation of this is not
to be found in a want of opportunity.
Instances have been numerous, in the
West, at least, in which railroad corporations have taken possession of land
and constructed their roads over the
same, without purchase and before any
condemnation of the realty has taken
place. In that part of the country vast
tracts of land lie unoccupied, the owners often residing in distant states, and
in ignorance of what is being done on
or about their land. Railroad corporations have consequently found it conVOL. XXVII.-89

venient to build their lines of railway
in disregard of the rights of the owners
of the soil. As the country becomes
settled, and -the land increases in value
the owners of property which has thus
been confiscated, institute actions against
the corporations, and it then becomes
important to know whether they are entitled, upon a final condemnation of the
realty, to recover for the value of improvements thus placed upon their land
without their knowledge or assent. The
explanation of the fact that this question has been hitherto so seldom raised,
may possibly be that the profession has
heretofore regarded the case as governed
by that principle of elementary law
which gives to the owner of the free-
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hold all annexations made by a stranger
and not under color of title. In view of
the conclusion reached in the principal
case, a farther examination of some of
the principles which that case suggests
may prove of general interest.
I. The Constitution of the United
States provides that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law, and that
private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Amendments to the Constitution, Art.V.
These constitutional provisions for the
protection of private property, are limitations of the power of the national
government only, and are in no wise a
restriction upon the state governments:
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243;
Wfithers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84 ; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166176 ; Concord Railroad Co. v. Greely, 17.
N. H. 47 ; Orrv. Quir;by, 54 N. H. 590;
599, 606; Murphy v. The People, 2
Cowen 815-818; Wocdfolkv. The Nashville, 4c., RailroadCo., 2 Swan 422-431;
Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N. C. 550; Cairo,
4-c., Railroad Co. v. Turner,31 Ark. 494.
However, since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, providing that
no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process
of law, the courts would undoubtedly
hold any act authorizing private property to be taken for public use without
just compensation, to be void, as in
contravention of the Constitution of the
United States.
At one time it seems to have been
questioned whether the federal government could exercise the right of eminent domain within the jurisdiction of
the states, and the practice was quite
general for the states to condemn
property for the uses of the national
government.
The state courts argued
that the provision contained in the state
constitutions for taking property for a
public use embraced the uses of the
national government as well as those

of the state government, since those
uses were public also : Reddallv.Br an,
14 Md. 444. The fact wat lost sighit
of that the word public, in this connection meant pertaining to the same government. Since the very able and satisfactory opinion pronounced by Mr.
Justice CooLEY, in Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, followed in Kohl
v. United States, I Otto 367, it is now
regarded as settled that the national
government possesses the right of eminent domain, and that for the uses
of that government condemnation proceedings should be carried on under its
authority, and not under that of the
states.
II. It is now regarded as established
beyond controversy that independent
of any constitutional provision on the
subject, a state cannot take private
property for public use without just
compensation : Gardner v. Newburg, 2
Johns. Ch. 162 ; Sinnickson v. .Tohnson,
2 Harr. 145 ; Young v. AcKenzie, 3
Kelly (Ga.) 31; Perham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341; The State v. Glen,
7 Jones L. 321 ; Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N. C. 550; Piscatagua Bridge Co.,
v. The New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N.
H. 66 ; Petition of Mt. Washington Railroad Co., 35 N. H. 134, 141,142. The
constitutional provisions reqairing compensation to be made in such cases, did
not change the common law, but were
adopted in order to place "the just
principles of the common law on that
subject beyond the power of ordinary
legislation to change or control them-"
Pvmpelyl v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.
177.
New Hampshire and North Carolina
are the only states whose constitution
does not contain an express provision
for compensation to the owners of private property taken for a public use.
III. If private property cannot be
taken for a public use without just compensation, it is important to know at
what time the owner of the property
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taken is entitled to receive his compensation. In the large majority of the
states, the constitutional provisions are
silent as to the time when this must be
done.
But the courts in construing
these provisions have held that compensation must be first made or secured.
And this may be regarded as established beyond all question : Doe v. Georgia
Railroad Co., 1 Ga. 524; Young v. .3cKenzie, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 524; Bloodgood
v. M',hawk-, -c., Railroad Co., 18 Wend.
9 ; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 ;
Powers v. Bears, 12 Wis. 213, 222;
Brock v. Hishen, 40 Wis. 681; Davis
Y. San Lorenzo Railroad Co., 47 Cal.
517 ; McAulay v. Western Vermont, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 33 Vt. 321; Hall v.
The People, 57 Ill. 307, 316; Gray v.
First Division of St. Paul, 4-c., Railroad Co., 13 Minn. 315, 322. This is
in conformity with the rule in all ordinary cases, that where no provision
is made for credit, the vendor is entitled
to the purchase-money concurrently
with the delivery of the property, and
is not bound to make the delivery until
he has received the payment.
The only exception to the rule that
the owner is entitled to have his compensation first paid or secured upon a
definite fund, is that made in favor of
a taking by the state itself, or by a
county or a town. It is said to be presumed in favor of municipalities that
they are always responsible, and that
their property is a fund to which the
owner can resort without risk of loss.
Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132; Loweree v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 151; McClinton v. Pittsburgh,4-c., RailroadCo.,
66 Penn. St. 404; Ash v. Cummings,
50 N. H. 591, 621. It is, however,
essential that the law authorizing the
property to be taken should contain a
provision for compensation, it otherwise being void. See the cases cited
above, and also fcAuley v. IWeller, 12
Cal. 500. The act will be valid, however, if a subsequent act is passed curing
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the defect : McAuley v. Weller, 12 Cal.
500; Bonaparte v. Camden, 4-c., Railroad Co., 1 Baldw. 205.
This distinction between a taking by
the state and by an individual person
or a corporation, is repudiated by Mr.
Justice DoE, in his very able dissent.
ing opinion in Orr v. Quimby, 5 N. H.
651, and Mr. Chief Justice REDFIELD,
in an article in 15 Am. Law. Reg. (N.
S.) 199,.takes a similar view of the
matter.
In times of war or impending public
danger, it sometimes becomes imperatively necessary that private property
should be first appropriated, and provision made for compensation afterwards. And it seems that under such
circumstances the property may be first
taken : Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115, 134 ; United States v. Russell, 13
Wall. 623.
IV. Inasmuch as private property
cannot be taken until compensation has
been first made or secured, it follows
that an entry made without payment or
waiver of payment, and which is not
for the purpose of a preliminary survey
with a view to determine the exact property to be taken, is unlawful and a trespass: Brown v. Powell, 25 Penn. St.
229 ; Johnson v. Alamada County, 14
Cal. 106. And the court will grant an
injunction restraining from such an
entry: Bonaparte v. Camden, 4-c., Railroad Co., I Baldw. 205, 226; Jersey City,
4-c., Railroad Co., v. Jersey City, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 20N. J. Eq. 60; Stacy v.
Vermont, 4-c., Railroad Co., 27 Vt. 14.
If, however, the entry has been consummated, the owner is entitled to recover
possession in an action ofejectment: Doe
v. Gcorgia Railroad Co., 1 Ga. 524;
lVeisbrod v. Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
21 Wis. 602 ; McClinton v. Pittsburgh,
4-c., Railroad Co., 66 Penn. St. 404 ;
Vager v. Troy Union Railroad Co., 25
N. Y. 526. The owner, thus kept out of
possession, is also entitled to recover his
damages from the trespasser: Mayor
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v. Perkins, So Ga. 154; Hall v. Pickering, 40 Me. 548; L-op v. Chamberlain, 20 Wis. 135 ; i'arrisburgv. Crangle, 3 W. & S. 464.
V. In ascertaining the compensation
to be paid to the owner, the value of
the property must be estimated as of
the time when condemnation proceedings are instituted, in distinction from
the time when the public unlawfully
entered and took possession : Sherwood
v. St. Paul, 4-c.,RailroadCo., 21 Minn.
122 ; San Francisco, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
T. Mahoney, 29 Cal. 112; Cook v. The
Commissioners, 66 Il1. 115 ; Virginia,
4-c., Railroad Co., v. Lovdoy, 8 Nev.
100; Stafford v. Providence, 10 R. I.
567. In this last case, it became necessary, after the first taking, to take
additional land to complete the improvement undertaken by the city. The
improvement already made had considerably enhanced the adjacent property, and it was urged that the value of
the property to be taken should be estimated at its value at the time the improvement was commenced. The court,
however, thought otherwise, and recovery was had for the value at the
time of the subsequent taking.
VI. At common law, the rule unquestionably is, that annexations of
chattels to another's realty, made without the assent of the landowner, become
a part of such realty, and are the property of the owner of the freehold:
Britton's Pleas of the Crown, ch. 33 ;
Y-rst Paris, 4-c., v. Jones, 8 Cush. 184;
Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass. 309, 317 ;
Webster v. Potter, 105 Mass. 414,
416; Cress v. Jack, 3 Watts 239;
West v. Stewart, 7 Penn. St. 122. Not
only is the person making the annexation wholly unable to remove the thing
annexed, or to claim compensation
therefor, but, as is said in Frear v.
Tardenburgh, 5 Johns. R. 272, 278,
the owner of the freehold is not
under even the slightest moral obligation to remunerate him for the same.

The only exception to this rule is
that made in favor of one who has gone
on and made improvements un4er color
of title. And in these cases adequate
provision has been made by statute in
the several states, conforming the rule
in law to that in equity in similar cases •
Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story R. 478, 478,
et seq. The civil law upon this subject was the same as the common
law, in so far that a trespasser, not entering under color of title, could not
recover for the value of improvements
wrongfully made by him upon the
realty. The maxim was: Preterea, id
quod in solo nostro ab aliquo wdificatum
est, quam vis ille
sue nomine cedificaverit, jure naturali nostrumfit, quia
superficies solo cedit. Gains Comm. Lib.
11 73; Bonneyv. Foss, 62 Me. 251.
When the property of one is carried
without any fault of his upon the realty
of another, the owner of the freehold is
not considered as having obtained any
title to the property, as against the
original owner. Thus, in case property
carried off by a flood, and stranded on
the premises of another, the owner can
follow it, enter, and take it from the
premises, or if the owner of the realty
convert it, can recover its value: Fostey
v. Bridge Co., 16 Penn. St. 393; Etter
v. Edwards, 4 Watts 63.
VII. We come now to consider more
especially the important question involved in the principal case, the right
of the owner, at the time of the
condemnation of the realty, to recover
compensation for the improvements unlawfully made upon it by the railroad
company. The correctness of the general principles we have above considered, is not denied in the principal
case. The court simply claims that it
is not restricted to an inquiry into the
mere value of the realty taken, but
may inquire what is a just compensation as between the parties, and it concludes that it is not essential to a " just
compensation" that the owner of the
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freehold should be compensated for the
rails, ties, &c., which have cost him
nothing, The learned Chief Justice
relying upon the correctess of the conclusion reached, apparently deemed it
unnecessary to fortify it by any citation of authorities. The same question,
however, has been similarly decided
in two other states. In Lyon v. Green
Bay, J-c., RailroadCo., 42 Wis. 543, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin said that
"it would be unjust to compel the
eompany to pay the owner for structures placed upon the land by the company at its own expense, and in view
of a subsequent condemnation of the
land to its use," thereby reaching the
same conclusion as in the principal
case. And in Justice v. Nesquehoning
Valley Railroad Co. 6 Norris 28, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached
a conclusion similar to the above, but
upon different, though, as it seems to us,
no more satisfactory grounds. The court
there said: "There was no intent to
hold adversely as a trespasser, nor to
improve the ground, or to make it usefnl and valuable by the erection. The
rails and ties were not intended to be
attached to the freehold, but were laid
down as part of an easement under a
franchise of the state. There was no
intent to use the land as an owner
would, and no intent to abandon the
materials to the use of the owner, but
they were subject to a legal proceeding, resulting in maintaining both
ownership and use for the charter purposes. We think, therefore, the ownership of the rails, ties, &c., did not vest
in the plaintiff in error by the mere
trespass in the original entry." The
Supreme Court of California, in California Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 46
Cal. 85 (1873), reached a conclusion
in harmony with those above referred
to, and for reasons similar to those expressed in the Wisconsin case. It cannot, however, be considered as an antnority in favor of the principal case, as
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it was subsequently in effect overruled
in United States v. A Tract of Land in
Monterey Co., 47 Cal. 515. The distinction which the Chief Justice who
pronounced the decision in the latter
case, sought to draw between it and the
former case, certainly was a distinction
without a difference, and Mr. Justice
RHODES, in concurring in the conclusion
reached, did so because he was "of the
opinion that the doctrine on which it
was based was opposed to and overthrew the doctrine" of the former case.
While there is, then, authority sustaining the principal case, there is also
authority flatly contradicting it. Inaddition to the case of The United States
v. A Tract of Land, 4-c., supra, there
are also the cases of Graham v. Connersville,
4-c., Railroad Co., 36 Ind. 463, and
Matter of Long Island Railroad Co., 6
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 298, which are to the
same effect. Mr. Mills, in his excellent
treatise on eminent domain, also cites
to the same point, Hfibbs v. Chicago
Railroad Co., 39 Iowa 340. The opm.
ion pronounced in that case fails to
reach the question at issue, and its citation in that connection is undoubtedly
accidental, so that the authorities which
have expressly passed upon this sub.
ject, now appear to be evenly balanced.
The reasoning in the Pennsylvania
case seems unsatisfactory and erroneous.
We can see no principle of law which
sanctions the theory there advanced,
that the ownership of the rails, ties,
&c., remained in the railroad company.
Had the company owned the realty,
and then laid the track thereon, we suppose no one would question that the
track had ceased to be a chattel and had
become a part ofthe realty. It would be
a fixture and would pass between vendor and vendee as such. (I.) It is
actually annexed to the realty, or to
the ties imbedded in the realty and
appurtenant thereto. (2.) It is applicable to the use to which that part of
the realty to which it is anexed is to
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be devoted. (3.) It is placed there
for a permanent and not a temporary
purpose. The union of these three requisities make it a fixture. See McRea
v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66
N. Y. 496. It is not annexed under
color of title. It does not come upon
the realty by accident, but is deliberately
placed there by its owner. The fact
that the trespasser is a corporation rather than a natural person, is only an
additional aggravation, as it is proverbial that corporations have "neither a
body to be kicked, nor a soul to be
damned." The fact that the corporation has been clothed with the right of
eminent domain is immaterial, as it had
not seen fit to avail itself of that right at
the time the annexation was made, and
that is the time which fixes the character of the property. The fact that the
track was put upon the realty with no
intention of abandoning it to the owner
of the freehold, is immaterial, as the
law never inquires into that intention.
The reasoning of the principal case,
and that of the Wisconsin case, cannot
be regarded as any more satisfactory.
The phrase a "just compensation"
has had its meaning fixed by a long
series of adjudications, holding it to
mean " an equivalent for that which is
taken." Bloodgood v. Mohawk, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 18 Wend. 9, 35; Keasy
v. Louisville, 4 Dana 154, 155; Bonaparte v. Camden, &.c., Railroad Co., 1
Baldw. 205, 227 ; Cunninghamv. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625, 635 ; Winona, &-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267,
280; Henry v. Dubuque, 4-c., Railroad
Co., 2 Iowa 283 ; Virginia, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, and this means
the full and fair market value of that
which is taken : Somerville, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Doughty, 2 Zabriskie 495;
Gilsey v. Cincinnati, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
4 Ohio St. 308 ; Matter of Furman, 4-c.,
17 Wend. 649, 670 ; Matter of William,
4-c., 19 Wend. 678, 690 ; Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal.

247, 261 ; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss.
277, 242 ; East Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. v. Hottenstine, 47 Penn. St. 28.
How this market value may have been
created is not important, even though
an increased value may have been caused
by the very corporation which seeks to
condemn: Stafford v. Providence, 10
R. I. 567. We assume then that i! is
settled:
1. That the track, ties, &c., at the
time of the condemnation of the realty
belonged in law and in equity to the
owner of the freehold.
2. That the owner of the realty is
entitled to a "just compensation,"
which means in law an equivalent for
that which is taken.
3. That he does not receive an equivalent for that which is taken, if the
rails, ties, &c., are taken from him
and given to another without any compensation whatever.
Moreover, we regard the conclusion
reached in the principal case as opposed
to public policy, and, in a large degree, subversive of the spirit of the constitutional provisions on this subject.
If this view of the law is finally to prevail, a railroad company is licensed to
go upon another's realty, and without
his knowledge or assent, construct its
track across the same, without any
danger of being compelled to pay for
the track and ties upon the final condemnation of the realty. The result is
to encourage railroad corporations in
so doing.
And this being so, the
owner is forced either to submit to an
unjustifiable wrong or to commence a
lawsuit. Under the constitutional provision that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just
compensation," it was never intended
to drive the owner into a lawsuit, nor
to encourage any policy which would
result in that: Piscataqua Bridge Co.,
v. New Hampshire Bridge Co., 7 N. H.
35, 70 ; San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal.
114 ; Orrv. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590, 642.
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In this last case it is said: "Legal
proceedings may be necessary, and he
(the owner), may be entitled to notice
if U: can be found ; but so far as such
proceedings are necessary for his enjoyment of his constitutional right, they
are to be instituted and carried on by
the public, because the public power is
His
limited by his reserved right.
property is taken without payment, if
it is taken with the payment of a sum
procurable only by his unremunerated
outlay of an equal or greater amount."

VIII. It is not necessary to consider
at length those cases in which the improvements were made before compensation, but with the knowledge or assent
of the owner of the realty. In such
cases there is no doubt that he will not
be permitted.to recover for the value of
improvements made under such circumstances: Emerson v. Western Railroad
Co., 75 IMI. 176.
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
Minnea polis.
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A tenant may remove fixtures while he remains in possession, but if he surrenders possession at the termination of his term without removing the fixtures and
without reserving the right to remove them by agreement with the landlord, he
abandons all right in them. The title to the fixtures would then accrue to the
landlord as part of his realty.
Where before the surrender of possession the tenant asked the landlord, if he
might leave the fixtures in the demised premises (a store), to which the landlord
replied that he was willing, as the fixtures might help him to rent the store :
Held, that this was simply a permission to leave the fixtures behind, and did not,
imply a license to re-enter and remove them after surrender of possession.
APPEAL

from the County Court of Winnebago county..

Geo. W. Burnel, for appellants.
ifooper J. Buxton, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-There is no doubt that the appellants might haveremoved the fixtures while they remained in possession of the
store; neither is there any doubt that if they surrendered possession without removing the fixtures and without reserving their
right to remove them by agreement with, the respondent, they
abandoned all right in them. The title to the fixtures would then
accrue to the respondent as part of his realty: Keogh v. Daniel,.
12 Wis. 161. A very comprehensive and interesting discussion of
these questions will be found in Torrey v. Burnett, 9 Yroom 457,.
cited by the learned counsel of the appellants.
RYAN,
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The case comes here, without bill of exceptions, upon the findings of the court below. And the only question is whether the
judgment is sustained by the facts found. The learned judge of
the court below finds in effect that the fixtures were not moved
when the appellants surrendered possession after the termination of
their term. He further finds that the respondent did not agree
with the appellants to permit the fixtures to be removed after the
termination of the lease. These findings of themselves, would be
fatal to the right of the appellants. But the learned judge still
further finds that, before surrender of possession, the appellants
asked the respondent if they might leave the fixtures in the store,
and that the respondent replied that he was willing they should, as
the fixtures might help him to rent the store. It is understood
that this finding of evidence was to avoid the necessity of a bill of
exceptions.
The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the conversation between the parties implies a license to re-enter and remove
the fixtures after surrender of possession. The court cannot so
hold. It was a permission to leave behind, not to re-enter and
remove. The understandings of the parties here is essentially
different from that in Torrey v. Burnett, 8upra, where the landlord, before surrender, agreed to sell the fixture for the tenant after
surrender. This expressly recognised the right of property in the
tenant after surrender. It was held to imply a right of re-entry to
remove. This court would hesitate to hold so. But here is no express
recognition of a right of property in the appellants after surrender.
The question and the answer found are both ambiguous. The
question will well bear the construction of being founded on the
convenience of the appellants-to leave the fixtures behind, to save*
the trouble and expense of removing them. And the answer may
well imply that understanding of the question. For it is difficult
to understand how the fixtures could aid the respondent in renting
his store, if they were removable at the pleasure of the appellants.
The answer is a mere assent to the fixtures being left, apparently
for the benefit of the respondent. It would be most dangerous
to imply a right to enter upon realty and sever things attached to
it, upon such vague and ambiguous language.
This view of the case renders it unnecessary to pass upon
the interesting question, ably discussed in the briefs of counsel,
whether, if the right to remove had remained in the appellants,
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they could exercise the right and sever the fixtures by replevin.
As the execution of the writ, however, effectually converted the
fixtures into personalty, there is iio difficulty in upholding the
judgment for return.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
The nature of the tenant's right to
remove his fixtures has been explained
in two ways: by supposing that the
chattel nature of the thing annexed is
preserved after its annexation, or by
considering that the thing ceases to be
a chattel by being annexed to the land,
and becomes real propety, but reducible again to the condition of a chattel
by separation from the realty. There
is some confusion and looseness of expression among the authorities on this
subject, occasioned probably by the fact
that in some relations and for some
putoses, as in favor of the creditors,
or the executors of a tenant, the chattel
nature of the thing is not entirely lost
by its annexation. For many, if not
most purposes, however, during the continuance of the annexation, the thing
is treated as a parcel of the realty ; and
though it is in the power of the party
making the annexation to reduce the
thing again to the state of goods and
chattels by severance, yet until so severed, it remains a part of the realty.
See, generally, Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt.
191 ; Hallen v. Runder, I Cr., M. & R.
275; Mackintosh v. Trotter, 3 M. & W.
184; 11inshall v. Lloyd, 2 Id. 450;
Dunergue v. Ramsey, 2 H. & C. 790;
Holland v. Hodgson, L. R. 7 C. P. 336 ;
Boyd v. Shorrock, L. R. 5 Eq. 78;
Barnett v. Lucas, 5 Ir. Com. Law 140;
Leev. Gaskell, 45 L. J. (Q. B. D.) 540 ;
Bltss v. Whitney, 9 Allen 114; Raddin v. Arnold, 116 Mass. 270 ; Guthrie
V. Jones, 108 Mass. 191 ; Preston v.
Briggs, 16 Vt. 129 ; Prescott v. I rells,
3 Nev. 82 ; Ewell on Fixtures 77. The
same rule seems to apply to trade fixtures
as well as to other fixtures See the
authorities above cited. See, however,
VOL. XXVII-90

Bx parte Gorely, 10 Jurist (N. S.)
1085; 34 L. J. (N. S.) Bank. I.
Iu finshall v. Lloyd, supra, PARRM,
B., speaking upon this point, said:
9,The principle of law is that ' quicquid
soloplantatur solo cedit,' the right of a
tenant is only to remove during his term
the fixtures he may have put up, and so
to make them cease to be any longer fixtures. That right of the tenant enables
the sheriff to take them under a writ
for the benefit of the tenants' creditors,"
and this statement of the law seems entirely accurate. Thus, it is settled by
the weight of authority, that so long
as they continue annexed to the realty
the value of fixtures is not recoverable
in trover : M1ackintosh v. Trotter, 3 M. &
W. 184 ; Roffley v. Henderson, 17 Q. B.
574; Colegrove v. Dias Santos, 2 B. &
C. 76; Longstaffv. Mfeagoe, 2 Ad. & E.
167 ; Pierce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. 559 ;
Raddin v. Arnold, 116 Mass. 270;
Guthrie v. Jones, 1t8 Mass. 191 ; Prescott v. Wlls, 3 Nev. 82 ; Overton v.
Killiston, 31 Penn. St. 155. There
are, however, some cases concerning
tenants' fixtures recoverable as against
the landlord, where a different opinion
has prevailed. See Moore v. Wood, 12
Abb. Pr. 393; Villar v. Mason, 25
Wis. 327 ; Miller v. Baker, I Met. 27 ;
Peck v. Knox, I Sweeny 311 ; Finney
v. W~atkins, 13 Mo. 291.
So, the price of fixtures to a house
sold while annexed, cannot be recovered under a declaration for goods sold
and delivered, they being, while annexed, a part of the freehold : Lee v.
Risden, 7 Taunt. 188; Nutt v. Butler,
5 Esp. 176.
It is well settled, likewise that fixtures, while annexed, are not goods and
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chattels within the meaning of the Englishbankrupt acts: Ryall v. Rolle, I Atk.
165; Callwick v. Swindell, Law Rep.
3E q. 249 ; Ex parte Belcher, 2 Mont. &
Ayr. 160; Clark v. Crownshaw, 3 B. &
Ad. 804 ; Boydell v. McMichael, 1 Cr.,
M. & R. 177; Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M.
& W. 450; Ewell on Fixtures 333 et
seg. And the rule is the same whether
the annexation is real or only constructive : Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B. (N.
S.) 115 ; Ex parte Astbury, Law Rep. 4
Ch. App. 630.
As to the time when tenants' fixtures
may be removed, the rule is generally
stated to be that this right of a tenant
for years must be exercised during the
continuance of his term, and, unless the
right is reserved by agreement, may not
be exercised after the expiration thereof,
and surrender of possession, and the rule
thus stated has prevailed ever since the
case in the Year Book, 20 Hen. VII.,
b, pl. 24, decided in the year 1504,
where we find the rule stated thus:
"And if a lessee for years makes such
a furnace for his advantage, or a dyer
makes his vats and vessels to carry on
his occupation during his term, he may
remove them; but if he suffers them to
remain fixed to the. earth after the end
of his term, then they belong to the
lessor."
See, also, Poole's Case, 1
Salk. 368 ; Ex parte Quincy, 1 Atk.
477 ; Dudley v. Warde, 1 Ambl. 113;
Minshall v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450;
Pugh v. Arton, Law Rep. 8 Eq. 626 ;
Gaffield v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. 192;
Moore v. Smith, 24 Ill. 512; a. c. 26
Ill. 392 ; Stockwell v. Marks, 17 Me.
455; Davis v. Buffum, 51 Me. 160;
Dingley v. Buffum, 57 Me. 381; Heffner v. Lewis, 73 Penn. St. 302 ; Davis
v. Moss, 38 Penn. St. 346 ; Overton v.
Williston, 31 Penn. St. 155 ; Preston v.
Briggs, 15 Vt. 129 ; Dostal v. McCaddon, 35 Iowa 318 ; Beci-worth v. Boyce,
9 Mo. 556 ; State v. Elliott, 11 N. H.
540 ; Brooks v. Galster, 51 Barb. 196 ;
Allen v. Kennedy, 40 Ind. 142. Per-

haps the rule might more accurately be
stated to be that the right of the tenant
to remove his fixtures must, in the absence of an agreement extending the
time of removal, be exercised either
during the term as fixed by the contract,
or during such further period as the tenant may lawfully and rightfully remain
in the possession of the demised premises : Weston v. Toodcock, 7 M. & W.
14; London Loan 6- Discount Co. v.
Drake, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 810; Merritt v.
Judd, 14 Cal. 59 ; Thomas v. Crout, 5
Bush 40; Cromie v. Hoover, 40 Ind. 49 ;
Allen v Kennedy, Id. 142. The true
ground of this rule seems to be that
the tenant's fixtures by their annexation become a part of the freehold, subject to the tenant's right during his
term to remove them and make them
again chattels, and that unless so removed they belong to the landlord as
a part of the realty. See Gibson v.
Hammersmith Railway Co., 2 Drew. &
Sm. 610; Leader v. Homewood, 5 C. B.
(N. S.) 545 ; and the principal case.
There are, however, certain recognised exceptions to the rule that the
right of removal must be exercised during the term and before surrender of
possession ; as where the tenant is
wrongfully prevented by the landlord
from removing them during the term:
See Moore v. Wood, 12 Abb. Pr. 393;
or where he is prevented by the use of
legal or equitable process, till after the
expiration of the term : Jilason v. Fenn,
13 Ill. 525 ; Bircher v. Parker,40 Mo.
118 ; s. c. 43 Mo. 443; Goodman v.
Hannibal 4- St. Joseph Railroad Co., 45
Mo, 33.
It is also well settled that the right to
remove fixtures may, as between landlord and tenant, be modified or extended by the agreement of the parties.
See Merritt v. Judd, supra; McCracken
v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30 ; Higgins v. Riddell,
12 Wis. 537 ; Gray v. Ogler, 2 Bush
256 ; White's Appeal, 10 Penn. St. 252;
Torry v. Burnett, 38 N. J. Law, 457
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also, Ewell on Fixtures 66 et seq. ; 149
et seq. Such an agreement may either
be express or implied from the terms of
some other agreement. Thus in Torry
v. Burnett, supra, the landlord agreed
to sell a trade fixture for the benefit of
the tenant, but failed to do so, and it was
held that the tenant had a reasonable
time to remove the fixture, although his
term had expired and possession been
surrendered to the landlord,
BEAsLEY, C. J., in delivering the
opinion of the court in this case said :
"The agreement on the part of the
landlord to endeavor to effect a sale of
the fixture for the benefit of the tenant,
carried with it an implied permission,
that it might be removed, if such enSuch ardeavor proved unsuccessful.
rangement, of necessity, involved the
fact that the tenant did not intend to
abandon the fixture to the landlord, and
it is quite unreasonable to suppose that
such an abandonment was meant in case
a sale was not effected. The engine
was left on the property for a specific
purpose, and with the assent of the laudowner; such purpose having failed, the
tenant did not lose his property, but
was entitled to remove it within a reasonable time." This case seems correct, both in principle and application;
the writer cannot concur in the doubt
implied in the principle case by the
statement ' this court would hesitate to
hold so.'
As to the principal case while the principles therein laid down are clearly correct, there is some little difficulty as to
their application. The right of the tenant
to remove his fixtures during his term
is believed, in the absence of a special agreement on the subject, to be a
right which he is uotbound to exercise,

but may w:aive, if he sees fit so to do.
In other words, he has a right to remove them during the term, but in
the absence of an agreement to that
effect is urider no obligation so to do.
In this view of the case a construction of
the question propounded by the tenants
to the landl ord, which founds it on the
conveniencee of the appellants, to leave
the fixtures behind to save the trouble
and expens e of removing them, when
they were under no obligation to remove them* and thus incur expense,
seems rathe r forced. On the other hand
it seems mitch more natural to suppose that, vvhatever may have been the
intention of'the landlord, the tenants intended by tihe question to ask permission
to remove the fixtures, and had the
answer of t he landlord been simply that
he was will ing, it would seem that the
decision on ght to have been in favor of
the tenants, for after all the question
is, what wias the leal intention of the
parties as sihown by the words they have
used, and i n determining this question,
such a con.struction ought to be given
to the ques tion as would not make it
senseless or useless. But the reason
assigned b2 the landlord for granting
permission to leave them, does imply
that he, at least, understood that they
were to be left permanently and might
help him rentthe store. The minds of
the parties t hen never met on the question whethe r the tenant might remove
the fixturess, and in this view of the
case, the de cision seems correct, for of
course the b urden is with the tenant to
show the al'leged license to remove after
the expirati on of the term.
MARSHALL D. EWELL,
Chicago.

